This paper reports as tudy investigating the degree of dissociation between performance shown by children with or without Down'ss yndrome (DS), matched on non-verbal MA-level, following an implicit or explicit learning procedure. Ta skspecific factors weretightly controlled using the same task for both modes of learning. The implicit learning task was based on the manipulation of ag raphic production principle.O ur proceduret rained participants to reverse the principle.I nt he explicit task, participants had to learn the twor ules that account for this reversed principle. Whether they weret rained implicitly or explicitly,p articipants then performed the same test in which the impact of their training was assessed.
Agrowing body of researchhas appeared in the last yearsonthe relationships between implicit and explicit learning (e.g. Shanks, Rowland, &Ranger, 2005; Wallach &Lebiere, 2003) .I mplicit learning covers all formso fu nintentional learning in which, as a consequence of repeated experience, an individual'sbehaviour becomes adapted to the structural regularities of as ituation without, at any time, being told to learna nything aboutt his situation (e.g. Perruchet &V inter,1 998; Reber,1 993). Explicit learning, by contrast, is best illustrated by situations in which rules (either grammatical, logical, or other)a re explicitly taught,p articipants being required to devote consciouse ffortt o recall them. These two modes of learning are obviously used naturallyb yh umans throughout their life. Their relevance forour adaptation to daily life justifies the study of their comparative efficiency in children, particularly in children with intellectual impairment. Indeed, the difficulties these individuals encounter in any task requiring effortful or intentional information processing are well documented in the literature (e.g. Bebko &L uhoarg, 1998; Bray,1 979; Brown, 1974) . However,t he discoveryt hat some cognitive capacities,based on automatic, non-intentional, or implicit information processing, are relatively preserved in these individuals has renewed interest in this domain of research (Jones, Vaughan, &Roberts, 2002; Parkin &Russo,1990; Takegata & Furutuka, 1993; Wyatt &C onners, 1998) . The present experiment aimed to compare both the implicit and explicit modes of information processing in typically developing children and children with Down'ssyndrome (DS) possessing IQsbetween 30 and 70. We investigated whether the degree of dissociationb etween the two learning modes differed across groups.
Three arguments are put forward in the literature to claim adissociation between the two formsofl earning. The first argument relates to the postulate of ageindependency advanced by Reber (1992) : implicit learning should be age-independent while explicit learning should evolvewith age. That implicit learning did not varyasafunction of age was concluded in several studies, whether theyinvolved typically developing children (Karatekin, Marcus, &W hite, 2007; Meulemans, Vand er Linden, &P erruchet, 1998; Reber,1 993; Thomas &N elson, 2001; Vinter &P erruchet, 2000) , elderly participants (Howard &Howard, 1989 , 1992 Myers &Conner,1992) , or children with intellectual disability (Vinter &D etable, 2003) .H owever,i nafew studies ac orrelation between both modes of learning and agew as found (Fletcher,M aybery, &B ennett, 2000 ; Maybery, Taylor,&O'Brien-Malone,1 995),a si tw as also reported in af ew implicitexplicit memorys tudies (Murphy,M cKone, &S lee, 2003; Wyatt&C onners, 1998) .
As econd argument deals with the IQ independency postulate sustained by Reber (1992) : implicit learning shouldb eI Q-independent, whilee xplicit learning performance should correlate with IQ.S everal studies have provided supportf or this claim (Atwell, Conners,&Merrill, 2003; Don, Schellenberg, Reber,D iGirolamo, & Wand, 2003; Feldman, Kerr,&Streissguth, 1985 ; McGeorge,C rawford, &K elly,1 997; Maybery et al.,1 995; Reber,W alkenfeld, &H ernstadt,1 991), though contradictory results werealso found (Fletcher et al.,2000; Salthouse, McGuthry, &Hambrick, 1999) . However,a ll of these studies,e xceptA twell et al.,h ave used differentt asks fort he investigation of explicitv ersus implicit learning. When assessing implicit and explicit performance on exactly the same task but under differenti nstructions, ac lear dissociation between the two types of learning with regard to IQ was obtained in an impressive study,c onducted on al arges ample of participants and analysing varied measures of learning and intelligence (Gebauer&M ackintosh, 2007) .
The third argument often brought to bearw hen the implicit and explicitm odes of learning are compared, suggests that implicit learning leads to better performance than explicit learning, and above all when complexmaterial is presented to the participants. Reber (1976) showed that, in an artificial grammar learning task, participants who engaged in an explicit process of rule discoveryperformed worsethan participants who learned incidentally.H owever,c ontradictoryr esults have again been published in the literature (e.g. Dienes,Broadbent, &Berry,1991; Dulany,Carlson, &Dewey, 1984) .The Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007) study revealed that the type of task played acrucial role in this comparison. To our knowledge, only the Atwell et al. (2003) study has compared directly the impact of bothmodes of learning in individuals with intellectual disability, using an artificial grammar learning paradigm. Theirc onclusion agreed with Reber (1976) , demonstrating as uperiority effect of implicit over explicit learning in participants.H owever,t heir study involved young adults with IQsv arying only from 50 to 75, and with intellectual impairment caused by mixed aetiologies. It therefore remains an open empirical questionw hether implicit learning leads to better performance than explicitl earning in childrenw ith IQs varying across aw ider range, from 30 to 70, and when studying asinglespecific aetiology.Inkeeping with the view that intellectual disabilities should be explored by identifying aetiologies and not merging them (e.g. Burack, 1990; Dykens &Hodapp,2001; Hodapp &Dykens,2001) , we included only individuals with DS. We also decided to use an on-verbal MA-level match fort he contrast group (seet he Methods section).
Agreater impact of implicit over explicit learning can be expected in childrenwith DS because two characteristics of their cognitive functioning, their overly compliant approach to tasks, and their strong tendencytorely on imitation (Rast &Meltzoff, 1995; Wright, Lewis, &Collis, 2006) would tend to shape their behaviour in accordance with the structureo ft he encountered situations.T he predominance of such 'empirical' functioning may make them particularly sensitive to the incidentalc onditions of learning and to the action of automatic associative processes that are thoughttocapture structural regularities present in the learning situation (Perruchet, Vinter,P acteau, & Gallego, 2002) . By contrast, their difficulties wheneffortful or intentional processing is required are regularly reported (e.g.C uskelly,J obling, &B uckley, 2002) . Indeed, implicit learning can be seen as af ormo fl earning driven by bottom-up processes, during which the individual'sbehaviour is progressively shaped in accordance with the particular features of environment. By contrast,e xplicitl earning requires effortful, conscious, purposeful control from individuals, and can be seen as driven by top-down influences. Interestingly,writing morethan four decades ago, Inhelder (1963) described in some detail the predominance of accommodation (bottom-up processes) over assimilation (top-down processes) in children with intellectual impairments, under a Piagetian framework.
The currentliterature on implicit memoryalso gives some support to the prediction of better implicit than explicitp erformance in individuals with DS (Krinsky-McHale, Kittler, Brown, Jenkins, &D evenny, 2005; Vicari, Bellucci,&Carlesimo, 2000) ,b ut these studies tested adults and used different tasks to assess the two types of memory. Note, however,that the Vicari et al. study included also ameasure of implicit learning, using the serial reaction time paradigm, which gives stronger supportt oo ur expectations concerning the relationshipsb etween implicit and explicit learning in individuals with DS.
The cognitive profile of individuals with DS is characterized by ac lear deficit in language ability,especiallyinmorphosyntax (e.g. Fowler, 1995) ,while visuospatial shorttermmemoryappearsrelativelypreserved(e.g. Hick,Botting, &Conti-Ramsden, 2005) . The linguistic deficit seems more pronounced in production than in comprehension (Vicari, 2006) . We therefore designed an explicittask that relied more on comprehension than production, and in which visuospatialc ues were added in order to facilitate task understanding. Following Gebauerand Mackintosh's(2007) methodology,weselected the samet ask to explore bothf orms of learning, but modified the instructions so that learning was incidental in one case, and intentional towardsthe rules themselves in the other case.
The implicit learning task we used was based on the manipulation of an atural covariation present in drawing closed geometrical figures, called the start-rotation principle (Van Sommers, 1984) . This principle states that whend rawing ac ircle, for instance, if the right-handeddrawers select astarting-point located at the top, theywill predominantlyu se an anticlockwise rotation, while as tarting-pointl ocated at the bottomw ill be mainly associated with ac lockwiser otation (Figure 1 ). This principle develops rapidlyinchildren between 4and 7years (Meulenbroek,Vinter,&Mounoud, 1993) .Inour task,wetrained participants, by implicit means,toassociate anticlockwise rotations with bottom starting-points (insteado ft op starting-points),a nd clockwise rotations with top starting-points (insteadofbottom starting-points), when theytraced over geometrical figures like circles, which went against their spontaneous drawing behaviour (Vinter &P erruchet, 1999 (Vinter &P erruchet, , 2000 . With respect to Seger's( 1998) classification of the types of implicit learning tasks, this task involved am otort ype of implicit learning, like the pursuit motor task or the serial reaction time task. These tasks have in common that learning is assessed via motor response facilitation. However,our graphic task appearsmuch easier than the serial reaction time task and, consequently,is particularly suitable fori ndividuals with relativelys evere intellectual disability.I th as already been shown to be successful in revealing their sensitivity to the implicit learning processes (Detable&V inter,2 004; Vinter &D etable, 2003) .H owever,w ould children with DS learna sw ell following an explicitt raining? To develop av ersion of the task adapted to an explicit learning procedure, we 'translated' the drawing behaviour elicited under the implicit instructions into two explicit rules. Following Atwell et al. (2003) , we expected,i nc hildren with DS, ag reater impact of learning in the implicit than explicit condition. However,the superiority of implicit learning would be absent in typically developing children, because theywould easily understand and memorize the simple rulest aught in the explicit condition. Finally, following the testingp hase, participants in the implicit learning condition were questioneda bouta ny explicit knowledge gained during the procedure. Similarly,participants in the explicitcondition were questioned about their explicit memoryo ft he rules theyl earned previously. Whatever the learning condition, we expectedt he level of explicitr ecollection of information or explicitm emoryf or participants with DS to be inferior to that of controls.
Method

Participants
The final sample consistedo f2 8r ight-handed children (13 females) with DS and 28 right-handed control children (14 females). The childrenw ith DS complied with the criteria fort he diagnosiso fm entalr etardation according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of MentalD isorders (DSM-IV) (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and had IQs between3 0a nd 70. Al arger number of children were actually recruited than werei ncluded in the analysis (DS children, N at outset ¼ 32; controls, N at outset ¼ 39). The selection wasb ased on two criteria. First, we retained only participants who spontaneously applied the start-rotation principle in am inimum of 7o ut of 12 cases in the tracing task theyr eceivedb efore training. Four children with DS and five controlsw ere not includedi nt he study fort his reason. Second, typically developing children were matched on mental age( MA) to children with DS. This criterion also resulted in some control children being left out, as detailed below.A n assessment of MAs was made using an on-verbal test, the Kohs Block Design Test (Kohs, 1920; F rencha daptation, 1972) . The choice fort he matching strategy was based on an assessment of non-verbalp erformance,a sb otht he implicit training task and the test consisted of mainly non-verbalc omponents. The DS participants were aged between 7;9 and 13;7,w ith am ean ageo f1 1;4.T he controls were aged between 4;8 and 7;5 (mean age ¼ 5 ; 11). None of the participants had ak nown secondaryp hysical or sensoryi mpairment. Parental consent waso btained for each child.
Both groups of children were divided into two learning groups, 14 children receiving implicit instructions and 14 explicit, in such aw ay that mean chronological agea nd mean MA weres imilar in both groups between the implicit and explicitl earners. Furthermore, from the 39 control childreni nitially tested, 28 were retained so that comparable mean MAswere obtained in the four subgroups of children (with or without DS in the implicit or explicitl earning condition). The main characteristics of the four subgroups are detailed in Table 1 .
Materials
All of the measures weretaken from the paper-and-pencilexperimentaltasks. To obtain an assessment of the spontaneous degree of the use of the start-rotation principle (baselinephase), we used atracing task in which the participants wererequired to trace twice over six pre-printed circles of 1.6 cm diameter displayed inside af rame of 23 £ 5cm. Ab lack point of 0.2 cm diameter indicating where to startt racing was located either at the top (12 o'clock) in half of the circles or at the bottom(6o'clock) in the other half. In the training phase of the implicit task,the participants wereasked to trace over as eries of 20 pre-printed circles (diameter1 .6 cm) displayed inside four frames of 21 £ 5cm( five circles in each frame), with two frames per sheet of paper. Again, ab lack point indicated where to start( the samel ocations as in the baseline phase)t ogether with an arrow of 1cmi nl ength, showing the direction of tracing (anticlockwise or clockwise). The arrow was displayed either 0.5 cm above the top starting-point or below the bottomstarting-point.
In the training phase of the explicittask,the participants were explainedthe rules, using four pre-printed circles (1.6 cm diameter) displayed inside two frameso f 12 £ 9.5 cm (two circles in each frame). In one frame, the circles had at op located starting-point with either a' big' arrow in black ink located 0.5 cm above the point, and showing the clockwised irection (a bold arrow of 1.6 cm in length, 0.2 cm in width),o ra'small' arrow in light grey ink (same location, anticlockwise direction), of 0.8 cm in length and 0.1 cm in width. In the otherf rame,t he two circles were similar, but the starting-points were located at the bottom; the 'big' arrow indicated an anticlockwise direction, while the small arrow ac lockwise direction. The differences of size and the intensity of colour of the arrows were intended to visually symbolize the 'most' and 'few' concepts used in the verbal instructions. Thesearrows and points provided important visuospatial cues to facilitate the understanding of the task instructions. The start-rotationp rinciple (Figure 1, top) and the differentfi gures used in the training phases are depicted in Figure 1 . Finally, whatever the training phase, the material used in the test was similar to the one described fort he baseline pre-test phase,except that the participants were required to trace once over 12 circles instead of twice over 6c ircles.
Procedure
The entire experimentals ession comprises four phases: baseline (pre-test), training, test, and explicitq uestioning. Af ew days (between 6a nd 9) separated the baseline phase from the training phase, while only 2-4 minutes separated the otherphases from one another. Atracing task over pre-printed circles was presented twicetothe participants in the baseline phase,with a1-day interval, to avoid the systematic repetition of similar types of movements as pointed out by VanSommers(1984) . The participants were told that the experimenter was interested in how accurate and fast theycould be when theyhad to trace over circles in one single movement, starting at prescribed positions. In a preliminarywarm-up task, theywere invited to drawspontaneously circles of different sizes, starting from the top or the bottom. Then, theywere required to trace twice, as accurately and as fast as possible, over six circles, three with at op and three with a bottomstarting-point. Theydid not receive any instructions concerning the movement rotation except if theye xplicitly asked in which directiont heys hould draw, in which case theyw ere told that theyc ould drawi nt he direction of their choice. The experimenter ensured that the participants started at the indicated position, and noted fore ach traced circle which movement direction theyu sed.A na ssessment of the spontaneous adherencet ot he start-rotation principle was made after the second repetition of the tracing task. Only the childrenw ho applied the principle fora tl east 7out of 12 circles were retained forthe training phase. The Kohs Block Design Test was given to the participants during one of these two baseline periods.
In the implicit learning phase, childrenw ere required to trace over as eries of 20 circles as accurately and as quickly as possible, starting at the indicated point and using the indicated movement direction. There weree qual numberso ft op/bottom startingpoints and clockwise/anticlockwise directions, but these parameterswere combined so that only 20% of the circles of the series were traced in conformity with the start-rotation principle, i.e. eight figures with at op starta nd clockwise rotation, eight with a bottomstartand anticlockwise rotation, two with atop startand anticlockwise rotation, and two with ab ottom starta nd clockwiser otation. The sequence of the various combinationsofs tarting-pointand rotation direction was random across the series.
In the explicit learning phase, childrenw ere told that the experimenter wanted to teach them 'howtodrawnice circles', starting either at the top or at the bottom of the circle. Theyw erep resented with the four circles displaying astarting-pointand big or small arrows to illustrate the rules (Figure 1) . The two circles with the top startw ere shown first. The experimenter told participants that there was ar ule ford rawing the circle starting at the top such that amovement 'going like that' (clockwise -pointing to the circle with the big arrow) should be used most often, in most of the cases,and that the movement 'going like that' (anticlockwise -p ointing to the circle with the small arrow) should be used less often,infew cases. Children had to repeat the rule,showing the corresponding illustration each time after the experimenterexpressed it, indicating with the appropriate movement the rotation directiona ssociated with, respectively, 'mosto ften -m ostc ases' or 'lesso ften -f ew cases'. This scenario was repeated five times, and the participants had to demonstrate the rule on their own in the sixth trial. The experimenter then introduced the cases in which ac ircle started at the bottom, wherethe rule was 'to go more often in that direction' (anticlockwise -pointing to the circle with the big arrow) than 'in that direction' (clockwise -pointing to the circle with the small arrow). The scenario was identical to that used fort op startc ircles.
The vocabularyu sed to express the meanings of 'more often'o r' less often'w as varied (e.g. most cases, many times, al ot of times, much). To facilitate the children's understanding of these terms, each learning session started with ashort'game'during which the experimenter tested whether the participants understoodw hat 'most' or 'few' meant.T en small plastic toys representing fruits were put on the table, and the experimenter told the children that she had decided to give them 'mosto ft he toys' (she put eight toys in front of them) while she took 'a few of them' (two toys).S he repeated this scenario twice, and then asked childrentotake'most of the toys' and to give her'afew of them'.All children, regardless of intellectual disability,gave two toys to the experimenter and took the remaining ones. At the end of the training phase,t he experimenter askedt he childrent or ecall the rules, with the help of illustrations showing acircle with atop startand acircle with abottom start: 'When youstartatthe top/bottom here, what should you do? Show me in what direction you trace most often/less often'. All children recalled the rulescorrectly.
Afew minutes after the training phase, either implicit or explicit, the test phase was introduced to the participants.T heyw ere askedt ot raceo ver as eries of 12 circles: 6with atop startand 6with abottom start. The instructions on test were identical for both learning groups. Theyw ere told 'to drawn ice circles on their own,t racing as quickly and accuratelya sp ossible over pre-drawn circles, starting at the indicated starting-point'. Regardless of the learning condition, if the participants asked which movement direction to use, theywere told that theyshould 'do as theythink fortracing nice circles as quickly and accurately as possible'. The directiono ft racing selected by the participant foreach circle was coded by the experimenter.Thus, their percentageof adherence to the principle after training could be assessed.
Finally, an explicitq uestioning phasef ollowed, to assess whether any explicit knowledge had been gained from the implicit training or to assess explicitmemoryf or rules. The implicit learnersweregiven aforced-choice test in which theywereasked to remember whentheyhad traced over circles starting at the top (or the bottom) during the training phase.W ith regard to each location, theyhad to decide whether theyhad used mainly an anticlockwise or clockwise movement direction (these directions were illustrated by ahand movement). The explicitlearnerswere also asked to rememberthe training phase,a nd to recall the rules theyl earned at this moment. We coded the numberofc orrect responses between 0and 2.
Results
We expected that both the implicit and explicit learning conditions would have an impacto nt he drawing behaviour of participants in this study,b ut with ad ifferential effect on children with DS. We assessed compliance with the start-rotation principle at baseline and at test, and considered achangeinperformance to be an index of learning. However,the amount of changethat was possible variedwith initial compliancelevelsthe higher the level, the greater the possible amount of change. Consequently,because baseline performancesc ovaried with the abilityt oe xhibit learning in the task, we decided to treat the pre-learning score as acovariate and to runaGroup (2) by Learning Condition (2) ANCOVA, with post-learning scoreast he dependent variable.
Learning Condition yieldedasignificant main effect. The degree of compliance with the principle at test remained higher after explicit( 44.05%) than implicit learning (26.5%)(F ð 1 ; 51Þ¼13: 8, p , : 01).Regardless of learning condition, the adherence to the principle at test did not differentiate children with DS (36.9%) from typically developing children (33.6%)( F , 1). However,a ss hown in Figure 2 , the Group £ Learning Condition interaction wassignificant ( F ð 1 ; 51Þ¼5 : 2, p , : 05). The impact of training was similar in both groups after the implicit learning procedure, while the typically developing children learned moreefficiently than childrenwith DS following the explicitt raining condition. In children with DS, the effect of training was clearly larger after an implicit procedure than after an explicito ne ( F ð 1 ; 25Þ¼21, p , : 01), thought hese children did show some learning after the explicit procedure, as demonstratedbythe drop in the degree of compliance with the start-rotation principle between baseline and test. No difference between the training groups appearedi n control children ( F ð 1 ; 25Þ , 1, p . : 50).
We looked forthe correlations (Spearman rank correlations)between the impact of learning (the difference between the compliance with the principle in pre-test and the one in post-testfor each participant) and mentalage.None of the correlations computed in the implicit condition were significant (DS participants: r ¼ : 08, t ð 12Þ , 1, p . : 30; non-DSp articipants: r ¼ : 06, t ð 12Þ , 1, p . : 30). The impact of implicit learning did not varya safunction of mentala ge irrespective of the group. In contrast,e xplicit learning correlated significantly with mentalage ( r ¼ : 56, t ð 26Þ¼3 : 5, p , : 01), and this correlation remained significant when computed only fort he participants with DS ( r ¼ : 60, t ð 12Þ¼2 : 6, p , : 05).Itwas marginally significant forthe typically developing children ( r ¼ : 49, t ð 12Þ¼1 : 95, p ¼ : 07).
Explicit recollection of information and explicit memory
Regardless of the type of learning, participants receivedthe same forced-choice explicit test at the end of the experimentals ession. In the case of implicit learning, the test investigated the explicit recollection of information the participants reported with respect to the specific associations between the starting location and the rotation direction theye xperienced during training. In the case of explicitl earning, the test assessed the degree of explicit memoryofthe rules participants displayed at the end of the experimentals ession.
An ANOVA was runwith Group(2) and Learning Condition (2) as between-subjects factors on the memorys core as the dependent variable. The results are showni n Figure 3 .
The Group factor just reached significance. Children with DS achieved alower level of explicitr ecollection of information (60.7%) than controls (73.2%)( F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼3 : 7, p ¼ : 05).Moreover,e xplicitknowledge resulting from arecording of the studied rules (75%) was higher than explicitk nowledge issued from the implicit procedure (58.9%) ( F ð 1 ; 52Þ¼6 : 1, p , : 05).T he Group £ Learning Condition interaction was not significant ( F ð 1 ; 52Þ , 1) .
Finally, we checked whether these percentages of explicitremembering significantly departed from chance (50%). Fort he participants with DS, the scores in the implicit learning condition (53.6%) did not departf rom chance ( t ð 13Þ¼0 : 56, p . : 50),b ut those in the explicitl earning condition (67.8%) did reach significance( t ð 13Þ¼2 : 7, p , : 05). Fort he typically developing children, the scores in the implicit learning condition (64.3%) differed significantly from chance ( t ð 13Þ¼2 : 3, p , : 05),asdid those obtained in the explicitl earning condition (82.1%)( t ð 13Þ¼4 : 8, p , : 01).
Discussion
The present experiment compared the effects of implicit and explicitl earning in children with and without DS. We selected the same task forboth learning conditions, but modified the instructions given to the participants.W ei nvestigated, in a post-experimentalp hase, the explicitk nowledgeg ained or remembered by the participants about the training phase.W ep aid particular attentiont oc hecking children'su nderstanding of the tasks, and to adding visuospatial cues (arrows, hand movements) each time verbal instructions were delivered. Finally, we focused on children with DS only,and did not mergedifferentaetiologies of intellectual impairment. These features make our study originalinr egard to the literature.
Our results demonstrate that the implicit performance of children with DS did not differ from that of their controls, but that theyl earned less in an explicitl earning context. Theseresults are in line with those reported in the learning literature (Atwell et al.,2003; Maybery et al.,1995; McGeorge et al.,1997; Myers&Conner,1992; Reber et al.,1991; Vinter &Detable, 2003) , as well as in the memoryliterature (e.g. Burack & Zigler, 1990; Krinsky-McHale et al.,2 005; P errig&Perrig, 1995; Vicari, 2001; W yatt & Conners, 1998; Yeates &Enrile, 2005) . Moreover,our results showed agreater impact of implicit learning than explicitlearning in children with DS. Note, however,that Klinger and Dawson (2001) reported results that werea to dds with these, showing that individuals with DS performed better in an explicitt han implicit rule formation condition, while controlssucceeded in bothconditions. The reason forthis divergence remains obscure to us. Superiority of an implicit over an explicit learning contexti n individuals with intellectual impairment, when an identical task was used,h as been revealed in only one study to date, but with adults (Atwell et al.,2 003).R eber (1976) claimed that such asuperiority would occur especially when the material structured by complexrules has to be processed. Surely,the explicit rules constituted more complex material forDSchildren than forcontrols. This is probably the reasonwhy no superiority effect appeared in typically developing children. However,t his claim has been challenged(e.g. Dienes et al.,1991) , and Gebauer and Mackintosh (2007) have shown that the relationshipsbetween the two types of learning are afunction of the task. They are also afunctionofthe subject'smental level, because complexity is arelativenotion. The particular sensitivity of children with DS to the implicit learning procedure could be due to ag lobal cognitive functioning in which an 'empirical' approach to tasks dominates (Wright et al., 2 006) .I tc ould also be arguedt hat the quantityo fm otor practice involved in the implicit task wass pecificallyf avourable to as trong impact of the implicit learning procedure in these children.
To what extent these results could be generalized to children with learning difficulties, in general, requires further empirical investigation, as demonstration of differences in several cognitive domains between individuals with DS and individuals with Williams syndrome, fori nstance, urges to caution.V icari( 2001) has shown that young adults with DS performed as well as MA-matched controlsintwo implicit learning tasks (among which one was aserial reaction time task), but not in an explicitmemory task. Ar eversep atterno fr esults waso btained when adolescents with Williams syndrome werecompared with MA-matched controls. However,this is in contrast to the results of am ore recent study,w hich revealed similar age-and IQ-related dissociations between implicit and explicit memoryinmiddle-aged adults with Williams syndrome or with DS, while no age-related dissociation was observedi na dults with unspecified intellectual impairment (Krinsky-McHale et al.,2 005). Allt hese contradictions call for caution when accounting forr esults in this domain. Studies on implicit-explicit memoryshould not be confusedwith studies on implicit-explicitlearning (Buchner & Wippich, 1998) . When the implicit and explicit processes are compared, similar tasks should be used (Gebauer&M akintosh, 2007) . When individuals with intellectual impairment are compared with controls, differenta etiologies should be studied separately.F inally, as pointed out by Krinsky-McHale et al. (2005) , ages hould also be taken into consideration. To date, the dissociation between implicit and explicit learning observed in our study in children with DS is echoed by the Atwell et al. study with adults with unspecified intellectual disability,and in the Gebauer and Mackintosh study with al arges ample of typically developing children and adults.
However,concluding that individuals with DS have aspecific impairment in explicit learning and notinimplicit learning needs to be made with further caution, considering our results. The level of compliance with the start-rotation principle demonstrated by the childrenwith DS after explicittraining (49.9%) makes it difficult to completely rule out an alternative hypothesis, arguing that these children behaved at chance in the test, maybe because of amore global deficit in verbal abilities and despite the precautions we took in order to ensurec hildren understood the task. We checked that these children did not systematically select the samemovement directionacross the 12 trials in the test, or did not systematically alternate between ac lockwisea nd an anticlockwise movement, two behaviourst hat could reflect difficulties in understanding the task's instructions. Alargenumberofchildren(19 out of 28) made explicitreference, on test, to what theyhad previously learned, acknowledging that theynow knew 'how to draw nice circles on their own'. However,i tc ould be suggested that the remaining nine children failed to recall the instructions delivered in the learning phase and, consequently,also failed to recall the associated procedure. Theywould maintain ahigh level of adherencet ot he principle at test, in contrast to those children retrieving explicitly the learning phase. To checkf or this potential bias, we compared the mean level of adherence to the principle at test achieved by the 19 children who explicitly referred to the learning phase (48%) to the mean percentagea chieved by the 9 remaining children (52%). The difference was not significant ( t ð 26Þ¼0 : 76, p . : 40) demonstrating that the children'se xplicitr etrieval of these instructions did not affect performance on the test. Moreover,ap revious study using instructions that explicitly asked children to drawt he circles, as theyh ad previously learned, revealed similar results (Detable, 2003) .
1
Thesearguments make the alternative hypothesis of abias due to as pecific verbal deficit rather unlikely.
Children with DS performed worse overall than the controlsi nt he final explicit questioning phase that was devoted to the investigation of collected or remembered explicit knowledgeabout the associations between the starting-pointlocations and the rotation directions. Owing to their often mentioned difficulties in expliciti nformation processing (e.g. Bebko &L uhaorg, 1998; Ellis, 1970) ,t his result wase xpected. More interestingly,theywere nevertheless better at remembering the associations learned in the explicit learning condition than at making expliciti nformation about these 1 In ap revious similar experiment, explicit instructions were used during testing, after the explicit training (Detable,2 003). The participants were told to use the rules that they had been taught during training. Note that in this experimental condition, participants with and without intellectual impairment demonstrated adecrease in the degree of compliance with the principle (they applied the principle in, respectively,48% and 31% of the cases). However, it could be argued that assessing differences in what the explicit and implicit groups learned during training becomes difficult in this case,because it is hard to knowwhether they were due to what occurred during training or to what they were told during testing. Using explicit instructions after the implicit training wasnot convenient, because it would makeitimpossible to disentangle conscious influences exerted by the test instructions from unconscious influences issued from the implicit training (Vinter &Perruchet, 1999) . In contrast, using implicit instructions after an explicit training was suited to our drawing task because,asthe participants did not practice any drawings between the baseline phase and the test phase,ifthe systematic modificationsoftheir behaviourappeared in the test, they would necessarily result from the training phase.The implicit instructions per se could not induce any changefromthe baseline condition. The instructions were most similar in baseline and test.
associations as experienced in their tracing behaviour in the implicit learning condition. Only the former performance wasa bove chance.B yc ontrast, typically developing children performed above chance in both conditions. These results call forf urther discussion.
Children with DS succeeded in the recall test of the explicitl earning condition, showing that differences betweent he explicit and implicit conditions cannot be attributed to flaws in the establishmentofexplicitlearning. Although their performance was globallyinferiortothat of controls, theymaintained in memorythe results of their previous explicitl earning, at least until the moment of the recall test (on average, 15 minutes after the end of the explicittraining).The shortduration that elapsed between learning and recall, togetherwith the relative simplicity of the rules, can account forthe good performance of the children with DS.
Accounting fort he explicit judgments following the implicit learning procedure requires greater caution. Shanks and St. John (1994) have cogently argued that implicit learnersm ay gain explicit knowledge from the training phase. This is in line with the theoryd eveloped by Perruchet and Vinter (2002) t hat implicit learning shapes an individual'sp henomenal awareness,i .e. how the learning situation is perceived, such that associations between implicit performance and explicita wareness aboutt he situationmay emerge. As amatteroff act, in our study,controlsperformed at an above chance level of correct judgments about ther ecognition of thep redominant associations between starting-pointa nd movement rotatione xperienced during the implicit training period. However,children with DS failed to succeed on this test. How can we account fort his result?
Our forced-choice explicittest relied on recognition, i.e. on deciding whether or not agiven case has been encountered often during the training phase.Asshown by Kinder, Shanks, Cock, and Tunney(2003) , participants may use differentstrategies in this test. By default, theywould use an analytic strategy based on the recollection of the episodic information contained in the previously experiencedt raining phase, comparing each case presented at the moment of the test with prior experience. Such astrategy would require them to reflect uponwhether aspecific association between starting-pointand movement rotation had already been encountered. As ac onsequence, participants' explicit judgments may be accurate or confused,c ompleteo rp artial,d epending on contextual factors. The first account of our results woulds uggest that this analytic strategy is impaired in children with DS, as supported by the literature describing the individuals with intellectual disability as processing information in amainly non-analytic way (e.g.B elmont &M itchell, 1987;T urnure, 1987) . Kinder et al. (2003) showed that participants may switchtoanon-analytic strategy,when using an analytic strategy turns out to be inefficient, and may process the 'familiarity' of the case presented at test. Such astrategy wouldrequireparticipants to reflect upon how 'familiar' to them is aspecific association between the starting-pointand the movement rotation. This process is very likely to be ab asis fort he establishment of the implicit learning (e.g.J ohnstone & Shanks, 2001; Perruchet &Vinter,2002; Servan-Schreiber &Anderson, 1990) :astraining progresses, the more frequently encountered case becomes more familiar than the others, and the participants develop ap reference towardst hem. Thus, processing familiarity at the moment of the explicit test should also lead to accurate explicit judgments. Acomplementaryaccount of our data would thus suggest that childrenwith DS are impaired at switching strategies, when one is inefficient. Thisdifficulty may come from impairments in executive functions (Pennington &B ennetto, 1998) or in metacognitive processing (Bebko &L uhoarg, 1998) . Further researchi sn eeded to obtain better insights into these issues.
